First Attempt at organizing my Research:

Before going any further, I need to re-organize what's going on in a systematized format.

1. Principle areas of theoretical research:

a. Flexible Pragmatism
b. The "In-between"
c. Reciprocity of Transience + Permanence

2. Existence of the In-between and of transience/permanence - Analysis of precedents:

a. general precedents

Aldo van Eyck – Amsterdam Orphanage
Aldo van Eyck – Amsterdam Playgrounds
Le Corbusier – Paris City of Refuge
Ron Witte + Sarah Whiting – Intracenter
Candilis, Josic, Woods – Cite Verticale
Candilis, Josic, Woods – Semiramis Building

b. shelter precedents

MacGillivray, Tanzmann – Los Angeles Mission
Herb Nadel – Union Rescue Mission
Errol Barron – Salvation Army Center of Hope
Davis + Joyce – Contra Costa County Adult Shelter

c. shelter precedents in Boston

(still compiling)

3. Research on the homeless condition:

a. Information gathering/analysis of the forms of homelessness and Boston statistics

By Type:
- War veterans
- Transitional families
- Children
- Single adults
- Mentally ill
- Elderly
- Disaster emergency

b. Analysis of each form of homelessness as how they engage the in-between, transience, and permanence

4. Organizational Analysis:

a. The organizations in Boston that I'm looking at while conducting a program analysis of each as how they are engaged architecturally with the In-between, transience and permanence:

- Boston Healthcare for the Homeless Program (health care, counseling)
- Traveler's Aid (Shelter, social work, job placement and education for all forms)
- Project Hope (care for women, children and families)
- New England Shelter for the Homeless (War veterans)
- Horizons for Homeless Children (Education for children)
- Veteran's Affairs (federal assistance for war veterans)

The Conundrum of the "In-Between"

Prior Assertion: If we can tentatively acknowledge that in our frame of reality, operations always occur as if they were tethered to a pragmatic framework that constantly shifts itself according to necessity, we can then principally agree to the existence of dichotomous polarities that spawn the vacillating actions that invoke “flexibility”.

Prior Assertion: I believe that while such finite polarities exist to allow for their inevitable reciprocal interaction with each other, the polar subjects in their autonomous “realities” are also governed by their own flexibly pragmatic frames (consisted in and of themselves) which then cause the polarities to act as if they were always on some sort of evolving and mutating scale that remains constantly existing, yet constantly shifting.

New Assertion: The recognition of a circumstance by which such multiple frames of shifting flexibilities could exist results in my predicament of the in-between. In effect, the In-between becomes exceptionally difficult to perceive as any manifestation or to be finitely obtainable in any sustained or stable moment. This is because the scales on which such things are measured never remain fixed or static and therefore makes attaining a single moment of In-between unnervingly complex and convoluted at any moment.

Essentially, my conundrum with the in-between is its apparent impossibility in any more than a single reality, and barely so in that single frame. Aldo Van Eyck, Georges Candilis, Alexis Josic and Shadrach Woods all claim the stable existence of the “two” – of the “twin-phenomena” – and the fact that it is not a required effect for the two to absolutely eradicate each other in their realized manifestation. But what seems to curiously escape from their assertion is the fact that the in-between, or the “doorstep” in Van Eyck’s terminology – supposedly the absolute link generated by the “natural” existence of a relational polarity – somehow always becomes the least manifested and the most confusing and uncomfortable position to be in. How exactly does this discomfiting position, this effectively bastardized realization of either polarity in any given dichotomous relationship engage, support, and necessitate itself for homelessness, let alone in any circumstance of architectural reality?

In the process of testing my conundrum with the In-between (specifically, the resulting condition of the polar relations between transience and permanence as they relate to shelter) I think I’ve more or less arrived at a disorienting uncertainty about the manifested condition of the “in-between” as it is pragmatically applied in architecture. So in order to gain better judgment of the plausibility for relations in duplicity, I’ve been building a larger list of case studies to test with. Here is where the constantly growing list stands, consisting of various “shelter” projects, community centers, non-profits, social housing, etc.:

1. Aldo van Eyck – Amsterdam Orphanage
2. Aldo van Eyck – Amsterdam Playgrounds
3. Le Corbusier – Paris City of Refuge
4. Ron Witte + Sarah Whiting – Intracenter
5. Candilis, Josic, Woods – Cite Verticale
6. Candilis, Josic, Woods – Semiramis Building

Shelter projects:

1. MacGillivray, Tanzmann – Los Angeles Mission
2. Herb Nadel – Union Rescue Mission
3. Errol Barron – Salvation Army Center of Hope
4. Davis + Joyce – Contra Costa County Adult Shelter

The fundamental conceptual questions of the “In-between” that I’m testing with the above listed projects:

1. If the In-between is said to exist, does it appear to exist?

Ah, the principle frustration of the “in-between”. I’m not quite sure how else to put it but to insist that the In-between just doesn’t seem capable of being manifest as any obtainable or sustainable object. In my view, the In-between is always realized in a condition of such incredible instability and tension that the properties of the distinct polarities that cultivate it and the concurrent recognition of each other is ironically always the moment of corruption and total annihilation of both. Yes, I know that on an elementary level it’s true that any two related polarities can possibly exist simultaneously in abstract localities. But my dissension arises when I consider that they become permanently adjacent to each other as van Eyck argues – they are seemingly always destroyed simultaneously and therefore do not ever accumulate to any entity retaining not just the memory but the total embodied existence of both progenitors.

2. If the In-between appears, does it appear as the accumulated polarities or does it appear as something above and beyond the polarities that enabled its existence?

As I ended in the previous question, my opinion is that the resulting product is most frequently not in any means the continued existence of the polarities. At best, the result always seems to be some sort of residue or by-product that becomes something else. While this is true for almost any two things that are engaged in any sort of mathematical process, it should not be true for the theoretical construction of an In-between. In my view, the In-between product should not be anymore or any less than the participating functions of the equation and that if its calculated result is something that is above and beyond all of the functions, then it is no longer, in any manifestation, what it was originally and it moves beyond merely an In-between.

3. If the In-between is said to exist, is it confused and disorienting and if so, does it accomplish its purpose for not only itself, but also the divergent polarities in this state?

After a brief survey of a project such as the Intracenter by Ron Witte and Sarah Whiting, just reading about a concept of In-between like “provoking a continual bifurcation of intimacy and alienation” leaves me feeling perplexed about any potentiality of fulfilling a “purpose” with an In-between. As we already know, in a traditional sense everyone always tries to apply architecture that somehow fulfills, that acts as a “whole” to accomplishing a programmatic necessity within the single frame. And because of the inherent tensions of the In-between, and the fact that it somehow goes against any idea of fulfilling the need of a single pole, it causes such excessive discomfort for me and goes against the traditional concepts of fulfillment. I guess what I’m trying to gauge in the case of the In-between, is whether or not for a programmatic polarity between transience and permanence or intimacy and alienation, purpose is only successfully gained within a condition of continual “bifurcation”. But as has been made clear already, I also have an equal amount of dissatisfaction with just bifurcation.

Essentially then, instead of perceiving the objective goal as being merely either the fulfillment of a single pole or of both poles in the way that “twin-phenomena” is argued to do, I’ve started to look at it from the idea that certain programs actually can only ever be in state of confusion, and that this confusion, this disorientation is success by its own right.

Designing for the Homeless 2: Permanence

Why is “Permanence” a relevant concept?

Well, essentially because I find that permanence is commonly the core subject that society enthusiastically prescribes both consciously and unconsciously to be architecture’s inherent “turf” and its single pragmatic pursuit. One could go so far as to assert that this is the consequence of architecture having been systematically objectified as the embodiment of stability, or otherwise the permanent state; this simply because of the assumption that, by virtue of its attainable form and delineation of space, it’s default manifestation as object invariably yields the condition of permanence.

But, as it’s been exposed through the various “heated” discussions I’ve had in the previous week, even the general concept of permanence itself remains amorphous and highly tenuous in its paradoxical antagonism to a stable and acceptable definition. Over the course of broad contemporary societal advances, it has indeed increasingly been subjected to relentless conceptual confusion and a myriad of enigmatic alterations to its perceived “original” method and practice. In my own view, this is of course on a large part due to society’s evolving predilection for impermanence as well as a systematic reduction of classic ideological perceptions of place, centralized culture, and even family for the sake of unexplored economic and professional gain. And by the rejection of rules traditionally regulated by site-restriction or site-situatedness, individuals adherent to the new mode of existence have evolved beyond to wanderlusts, nomads, and itinerants. What possible relevance then, is there for permanence if its traditional meaning is obsolete in direct reference to the new modes of existence?

Rather than rejecting permanence outright, I’m inclined to argue that ultimately and inevitably, the operation of this new mobility is still fundamentally dependent on a stable, albeit unrestrictive framework that facilitates for flexible exchange and interchange. This is essentially why I’d insist that permanence is a subject therefore indisputably consigned to a necessarily paradoxical position: as what it might possibly be objectively manifested as – the framework – but in reciprocal conjunction with its subjective antithesis – transience. In other words, I’m alleging that yes; permanence still does contain an indisputable necessity in itself for the sake of transience, and therefore, ultimately retains usefulness, though reformed. It is also on this relationship that I think flexible pragmatism finds its primary relevance; the mere existence and the condition of duplicity between these two naturally disparate concepts as they are perceived, actually qualifying each other as fundamental partners and therefore endowing a direct pragmatic value for each other in their concurrent dependency.

So what are the implications for Homelessness? Fundamentally speaking, I think that homelessness is the prime condition in which transience and permanence are constantly in a state of contemporaneous uncertainty yet ironic necessity – back and forth, to and fro, and somehow, continuously endowing pragmatic possibility upon each other as long as the socio-political sphere doesn’t figure out how to reform itself so that homelessness disappears. Very practically speaking, and harking back to the words of Sam Davis, architecture as it is objectified for homelessness from the level of frameworks or simply to bed organizational strategies, requires a capacity for permanence and transience, concurrently – the need for a degree of institutionalization yet of course, also a need to facilitate for and encourage personal freedom with which individuals once homeless would be empowered to choose (hopefully) towards personal permanence. Though some would argue that this concept of permanence is once again, obsolete in the sense of its dependency on a “traditional” and existing method of acceptable existence in our known society (that of physical permanence), I would argue that, no matter how theoretical one might get with homelessness, it is still a situation that is remarkably, inevitably and inescapably still directly restricted by its pragmatic consequences. And to satisfy the pragmatics of homelessness, the architecture, the social policy, the framework – these all must be pragmatic in and of themselves in the form of their immediately purposeful flexibility (somewhere with transience and permanence engaged like peas and carrots), or what I would call their divergent reciprocity.

Update of Claims

**As a result of my brief forays into general social theory, I think I’ve more or less arrived at two conclusive assertions. First, of what I consider as the essential pursuit of architecture – to be flexibly pragmatic. Not only must it be effectively useful in various conditions within the immediate and existing frame of absolute need, it must also contain the ability to engage purposefully in future frames of necessity. Second, that I’ll define “social” engagement, relevance and purpose, as summarized by Timothy, “as a condition of exchange or interchange”. With these two claims now tangibly at hand, I think I can now pursue “homelessness” through these lenses and engage in my first concept of Permanence.

"Designing" for the Homeless 1: Pragmatism

In reading Sam Davis' book "Designing for the Homeless", I didn’t expect it to be any more than a candid survey of a set of practical concerns for Homelessness as it related directly (or indirectly) to Design and architecture. The book is self-admittedly written without much verbalized insight about architecture in any theoretical frame beyond its immediate and performative capacities (such as the physical provision of "shelter"). But ironically, one can still surmise a number of theoretical interjections from the bulk of statistical data, descriptions, and precedents that explicate the various causal relationships and consequences leading to homelessness. The next several entries will be the thoughts and observations that I’ve extracted after completing Davis' survey.

1. Pragmatism

In many ways, Davis seems to make architecture’s relevance and role in resolving society’s problems, of homelessness, seem so easy – direct, effective, and somehow a useful endeavor. Rather then requiring any complicated or convoluted social theory for action, Davis seems to accept architecture’s role for what it is in society – a practice that is inherently and unquestionably infused with a non-artificial purpose to serve the needs of the underprivileged. But after processing through this inconspicuous case for architecture's supposed “intuitive” application, I wanted to actually understand the underlying nature of the theory behind all this – defined best as pragmatism.

First things first; I don’t want to confuse this exploration with the assumption that I don't believe in architecture's ability to be performative independent of pragmatics; instead, it’s because I’ve personally always been heavily prejudiced to want so much to justify architecture's relevant social ability (as is being obviated by this whole thesis thing) which in my mind, most frequently demands a sort of actionable and quantifiable return to reflect its given ability to perform “naturally”. Of course after reading Kant as elucidated in the previous entry, this idea of a “natural” justification is defunct in the sense that it is either beyond our grasp as a “higher representational calling” or that it’s a form of narcissism that contradicts and destroys its possible moral intention as soon as it is considered morally good. To debunk this further, as Richard Rorty writes in his book Philosophy and Social Hope, this theory of pragmatism for architecture is in fact not at all some metaphysical, representational credo in any Kantian terminology and instead, now illuminating Davis’ undefined intuitive association and application of architecture’s relevance to social action, it is an endeavor that finds itself in a continual pursuit “to serve transitory purposes (while) solving transitory problems”. This in other words, means a continuously shifting and evolving usefulness for, let’s say architecture, that adjusts according to the situation, the circumstance, and the frame of necessity. But what exactly has been defined as determining the satisfaction of a given necessity? What Rorty argues for is that we abandon the idea of a “necessity satisfied” as that which has been appropriated through predetermination, prejudgment, and predefinition – that a judgment of satisfaction is given instead only according to our contemporary frame of reality where it can and will be perceived and judged for its extent of “use” in how it relates itself with others within a causal network of relationships that also continues to transform and evolve with time and circumstance.

What exactly does this therefore suggest about architecture’s purpose and its relevance for Homelessness? Well, primarily a justification of the obvious – that architecture can and always will be potentially relevant if it is intended to be as such, and therefore, any interjection to reduce its applicability in any social justice related situation is thus not true. If architecture were to assume any role in the purpose of resolving homelessness, it can do so by acting with the ever evolving rules of pragmatic reality rather than above and beyond it – its usefulness in the relations it retains with others, with society, and with those that are homeless. This then also has implications on architecture’s practical application for the ever-changing homeless circumstance – rather than being static and merely useful at either its point of theoretical or physical entry or exit – and therefore is justified instead to contain a programmed capacity to sustain and be evolving and transitional when situations of homelessness modify and change according to the conditions of whichever contemporary persists at the moment of demand for architecture’s intervention. Though Davis’ architectural case study examples are more or less not as theoretically sustainable since they are manifested physically and frequently don’t extend their service beyond their defined purpose for the specified group of homeless individuals they intend to serve, the motivation of service that arises from his determination of service are clearly from a theory of Pragmatism and one that is justifiably purposeful.

In my own search for application and relevance, far too often it becomes something that it can never be – a search to be part of a greater generator and motivator than self. But perhaps all along I’ve managed to miss the point – that the only true motivator of service can be perceived by looking at the contemporary frame, not necessarily by being self-conscious or by looking at self, but by focusing on the subjective circumstance of how humans relate, or how we relate as self, and how we are necessarily all part of a single network, a single frame of reality, and a causal system of relation. If I am to assume that I will have any purpose, any usefulness, it is not by self-determinism or narcissism or by arriving at a judgment of an unreachable moral purpose for self. Instead, I have to look to my participation in this collaboration of existence and take part in it with architecture and thereafter, continue in this coordinated, evolving, and transforming relation of purpose and relevance in the hope for unending usefulness.

The Metaphysic of Architecture

I've gotta say that this guy writes with an amazing tenacity to be just hellish. But it's okay - I got through 80 pages of it.

Method: As I had agreed with Timothy, I thought that the most effective way to process all introductory and foundational explorations are to lay out all my thoughts in a format that reveals and opens further discussion - through questions and more questions.

Why read Kant? Because I thought it would be a fitting introduction into understanding the "nature" of why one has any interest in "the social", both as an independent philosophical construct and of architecture, and to test whether there is a cross-section between general social "action" and the tenants of architecture that might establish for itself a facility for social productivity. I suppose this exploration is what one could consider as being really, really, really basic and fundamental - but that, I think, is the point of all this preparatory research. My goal is to understand (hopefully concisely and strategically) the whole purpose of architecture as it relates itself specifically to any possible dimension of ethical purpose - essentially "service" - to humanity and the implications it has for specific social conditions such as "Homelessness".

I should however, also say here that it is not necessarily a given that my thesis will absolutely result as merely an academic exploration of "social architecture"; it could obviously turn into a slew of many different things beyond merely being a general and conceptual perusal of the realm of the "social" as it relates to architecture. One concept/principle that I have just recently begun to focus on with a little more specificity is the idea of "permanence" as it relates to the social realms of architecture (especially in its irony when we consider Homelessness). I will get into more detail for this in a subsequent entry - for now, it is not as immediately relevant to this exploration.

Responses to The Metaphysic of Morals:

Is architecture socially productive? This is possibly my most primary and fundamental question. Maybe a better way to put it is: what is social production in and of architecture? Let’s unpack this: According to Kant, the Ideal of any principle (in this case, of architecture) is what is most pure in its capacity for “moral good” and is, in and of itself, a categorical imperative. I think I’m interpreting this as the idea that architecture’s Will is solely dependent upon itself for any possibility of “goodness” and is therefore capable of affecting actions that are perceived as morally good, though not exclusively nor necessarily dependent upon such objectified results to define itself as “good”. As Kant said: “A good will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, nor its aptness for the attainment of something, only by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good itself and is of a higher esteem than any occurred effect or even of all its inclinations. Good Will’s goodness is independent of its utility and purpose”.

I guess the better way to put it at this stage, is unfortunately even more …generic – Is architecture, good? Is it qualified as being a “good will” itself or does it in fact require an independent “other” to prescribe it a facility for “good will” and social activism? (Such as, an architect either revealing or creating it depending on how one sees architecture’s being, or the action of architectures and the subsequent object of architecture that qualifies it as being architecture).

Does it act “naturally” as “good”, as it is prescribed? Or does architecture contain an “inclination” that is natural and independent of Reason? The necessity of this line of questioning is found in the fact that I’m really trying to understand whether or not architecture can “do” something: Does architecture have an inclination to do “good” or be socially productive without Reason or a conception of Duty? From duty, “good” is, at this point, an obvious notion of construction especially as it is dependent upon reasoning and justification that produces a required and sought after effect. What I’m trying to perceive is whether or not architecture can be independent of said notions of Duty and if it contains a Will of itself that is not simply an inclination for philanthropy. Does architecture occur without motive? Is it in fact, ever done outside the realm of Duty? And is its philanthropy ever possibly without moral content and therefore, socially productive as it is on its own without definition or recognition?

Continuing on the line of philanthropy (and in recollection of some of last semester’s Artifice discussions) what if architecture is object? If the “moral worth” of a socially relevant architecture is found in its principle and not at all dependent on the action and subsequent production, is the physical embodiment of this architecture without content? Can it ever contain a content of social relevance or is it merely worthless when it manifests as an object even with a social objective?

Now I come to probably the most personally relevant questions, beyond merely an inquisition of architecture itself and now, instead I position myself as the subject matter as I relate to architecture. As an example: if I am legislating that the Ideal of architecture for the homeless is a categorical principle of “architectural morality”, is it a principle of architecture or is it merely an artificial principle of self-interest as a result of my own conception of moral architecture? As I understand it right now through Kant, an action of service to, say the homeless, is actually ironically flawed and morally reprehensible as it requires a highly narcissistic action to confirm that it is morally good for itself. Thus I must ask – can any action of my own as it relates to architecture be principally, moral? Can my desire for an architecture for the homeless be principally “dignified” without the necessity of selfish recognition and objectification? Kant argues that such a “maxim” is possibly moral only through the method of the Will of a subject when it is the legislator of universal law.

Conclusive thoughts?

At this point, I offer no firm conclusion to these largely abstract and theoretical explorations that are more or less outside the immediate bounds of my thesis, let alone architecture. Perhaps one reason why this interests me so much is that I am in fact trying to debunk for myself the idea that architecture necessarily must be socially productive in some impulsive manner and that instead, it ought to be as such because it is its natural agenda, whether empirical or not, that any and all social realms are part and parcel with the principle of architecture and can easily be its own maxims when it is required to do so.